Google TAG discovered exploit chains used to install commercial spyware
Two separate operations that targeted Android, iOS, and Chrome with a number of zero-day exploits were described by Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG). The analysts emphasised the narrow scope and intense targeting of both initiatives. Both zero-day and n-day exploits were employed by the threat actors who were responsible for the attacks.
The campaign's final payload was a straightforward stager that pings the device's GPS location and enables the installation of an.IPA file (iOS application archive) on the harmed device.
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Users of Android devices running Chrome versions earlier than 106 were the primary target of the initial campaign's Android exploit chain. Three exploits, including one 0-day, made up the chain of compromise:
- CVE-2022-3723, a type confusion vulnerability in Chrome, found by Avast in the wild and fixed in October 2022 in version 107.0.5304.87.
- CVE-2022-4135, a Chrome GPU sandbox bypass only affecting Android (0-day at time of exploitation), fixed in November 2022. Sergei Glazunov from Project Zero helped analyze the exploit and wrote a root cause analysis for this bug.
- CVE-2022-38181, a privilege escalation bug fixed by ARM in August 2022. It is unclear if attackers had an exploit for this vulnerability before it was reported to ARM.
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Indicators of compromise
- https://cdn.cutlink[.]site/p/uu6ekt
- https://api.cutlink[.]site/api/s/N0NBL8/
- https://api.cutlink[.]site/api/s/3PU970/
- https://imjustarandomsite.3utilities[.]com
- www.sufficeconfigure[.]com - landing page and exploit delivery
- www.anglesyen[.]org - malware C2
- sys.brand.note
- sys.brand.notes
- sys.brand.doc
- /data/local/tmp/dropbox